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ABSTRACT
We have conducted three empirical studies of the effects of
friend recommendations and general ratings on how online
users make choices. These two components of social influ-
ence were investigated through user studies on Mechanical
Turk. We find that for a user deciding between two choices
an additional rating star has a much larger effect than an ad-
ditional friend’s recommendation on the probability of se-
lecting an item. Equally important, negative opinions from
friends are more influential than positive opinions, and peo-
ple exhibit more random behavior in their choices when the
decision involves less cost and risk. Our results can be gen-
eralized across different demographics, implying that indi-
viduals trade off recommendations from friends and ratings
in a similar fashion.
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INTRODUCTION
When making choices, people use information from a num-
ber of sources including friends, family, experts, media, and
the general public. Two sources that are particularly relevant
in an online setting are the opinions of friends and ratings
from the general public. Friends influence choices because
often their interests overlap with their friends’ interests. In
many cases, however, recommendations from one’s friends
are in stark contrast to opinions of individuals in the general
public who are not one’s friends.
An interesting question, which we study in this paper, is how
the decision of an online user is influenced by friend recom-
mendations and ratings from the general public, in partic-
ular when these two sources of information are in conflict
with each other. This question is interesting for two reasons:
First, understanding how people trade off friends’ opinions
with ratings from the general public helps to determine the
weight assigned by consumers to these two sources when
they are uncertain about choosing one of two possible op-
tions. Second, from a normative standpoint, this information
can be used when designing algorithms that display these
two sources of information in order to increase the probabil-
ity of a user selecting one of the options. For example, an on-
line social network platform that has information about how
a user’s friends and the general public have rated two differ-
ent items can display to the user the item that she is more
likely to select. On the other hand, if users tend to disregard
some source of information, this source need not be shown
to the user. Finally, an advertiser that wishes to make the
user choose a certain item may strategically choose which
pieces of information to show.
Specifically, focusing on friends and the general public as
two components of social influence is important because these
sources of social information are already used in a variety
of algorithms and applications online. Social recommender
systems take into account the actions of a user’s friends and
make recommendations accordingly. Social search is also
gaining more attention. Google recently launched its +1 but-
ton for search results and ads in order to improve its search
algorithm. If a user thinks that a search result or an ad is use-
ful she can click on the +1 button. The +1 will be displayed
along with the user’s name in the search results to all her
friends who subsequently search a similar query. For users
who are not friends, only the number of +1’s will be dis-
played. Facebook uses a similar approach for business pages
with the intention of getting higher click-through rates. The
model that we suggest can be leveraged to design better al-
gorithms for these and other similar applications.
In addition to quantifying how an individual makes choices
in the presence of social influence, we also consider how a
group of users makes decisions over time when exposed to
information from friends as well as ratings from the gen-
eral public. While previous work has studied how groups
make decisions in the presence of social influence, it has not
considered the different sources of this influence. For in-
stance, the model of Bendor et al. that considers individuals
making choices takes into account one source of informa-
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tion, namely the number of others that have chosen one item
out of two options [7]. By contrast we consider how mar-
ket share of the two options evolves in a setting where there
are two sources of social influence, namely opinions from
friends and ratings from the general public.
In particular, in this paper we asked the following questions:
• R1: How much are one’s choices influenced by the opin-
ions of her friends compared to ratings from the general
public? What mathematical model explains this?
• R2: Do friends’ negative opinions have a stronger or weaker
effect than friends’ positive opinions about an item?
• R3: Do friends’ opinions have the same effect on one’s
decision in higher risk situations versus lower risk situa-
tions?
• R4: How does market share evolve over time in the pres-
ence of different aspects of social influence?
To answer the first three questions, we performed user stud-
ies on Mechanical Turk using positive and negative opinions
from friends, as well as ratings from the general public; the
latter was represented by the average number of stars. We
find that the choice between two options fits a logit model.
Our major findings are that (1) an additional recommenda-
tion star has a much larger effect than an additional friend’s
recommendation on the probability of selecting an item, (2)
negative opinions from friends are more influential than pos-
itive opinions, and (3) people exhibit more random behav-
ior in their choices when the decision involves less cost and
risk. Our results are quite general in the sense that peo-
ple across different demographics trade off recommenda-
tions from friends and ratings in a similar fashion. With
respect to R4, we performed simulations and observed that
the variability of outcomes increases when the variability of
ratings increases, and inequality increases when individuals
become more selective in their recommendations.
RELATED WORK
Empirical Studies on Social Influence
A number of empirical studies have considered the effect
of social influence in various contexts, including prescrip-
tion drug adoption and use [16], viral and word of mouth
marketing [4], health plans [23], crime rates [10], and in-
vestment in the stock market [1, 15]. Tucker et al. focus on
how quality and popularity influence decisions on a wedding
website [25].
Guo et al. study the role of social networks in online shop-
ping [12]. Their study is performed on data from a leading
Chinese e-commerce website, which deploys a messaging
system among its users. The data contains users’ purchase
behavior as well as message exchanges among them; how-
ever, the authors did not have access to the content of the
messages. The main finding of the paper that is related to
our work is that, a message sent from a user that has pur-
chased an item increases the probability of purchase by the
user who got the message by 1%. The causal relation is not
definite, since the content of the messages is not known.
Salganik et al. study the effects of social influence over time
on the popularity of songs on an artificial online music mar-
ket [22]. They find that social influence may lead to unpre-
dictable and unequal outcomes. This work is related to our
study of the dynamics of market share in the presence of so-
cial influence; however, we consider two sources of social
influence. As we discuss below, the dynamics of social in-
fluence have also been analyzed theoretically.
Theoretical Models on Dynamics under Social Influence
Theoretical models focus mainly on the dynamics of mar-
ket share in the presence of social influence: before making
a decision, an individual observes what choices others have
made in the past [5, 8, 26]. More related to our study are [7,
9]. Bendor et al. presented a model that considers individu-
als making choices for which the objective evidence of their
relative value is weak [7]. In that case, individuals tend to
rely heavily on the prior choices of people in similar roles.
They then showed that the dynamics of market shares lead
to outcomes that appear to be deterministic in spite of be-
ing governed by a stochastic process. In other words, when
the objective evidence for the value of the choices is weak,
any sample path of this process quickly settles down to a
fraction of adopters that is not predetermined by the initial
conditions: ex ante, every outcome is just as (un)likely as
every other. In [9], the authors define the decision function
as a stochastic function of the social influence (in terms of
market share) and the inherent quality of the product. Their
main result is that market shares converge to an equilibrium.
These processes only take into account one source of social
information, namely the number of others which have cho-
sen one item over the other. By contrast we consider how
market share evolves in a setting with two sources of social
influence, namely opinions from friends and ratings from the
general public.
Sources of Social Influence
Most previous work models choosing between items as a
function of two factors: the individual’s own judgment and
social influence. However, different groups of people have
different levels of influence on one’s decision. For exam-
ple, when one wants to choose a movie to watch, some peo-
ple rely more on what the general ratings for the movie are
and some others more on what their friends who have al-
ready watched the movie say about it. Currently, with the
availability of social network data, in many online settings,
recommendations from friends are available in addition to
ratings and reviews from other people. Due to this fact, in
this work we focus on these two sources of social influence.
METHOD
In this section we describe the experimental design and re-
port some statistics about the data we collected. Our goal is
to study how people trade off information from friends and
the general public when choosing between two items. More-
over, our experiments allow us to compare a setting where
the information from friends consists of positive recommen-
dations to a setting where the information from friends con-
sists of negative opinions.
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Furthermore, we compare people’s choices with respect to
two types of decisions: one that involves a monetary cost
(booking a hotel) and a low risk decision that involves no
monetary cost (watching a movie trailer). We chose booking
hotels because the user cannot go and check it out before de-
ciding and should rely on the information she gets from oth-
ers. Similarly, a user may not have any information about a
movie trailer before she watches it. We can think of the set-
ting with the movie trailers as a less serious decision, since
it involves less cost (just a couple of minutes of one’s time)
and risk. Users often make choices of this type online, e.g.,
when watching Youtube videos, clicking on a link or ad, etc.
In total, we conducted three user studies: booking a ho-
tel with positive recommendations from friends (Study 1),
booking a hotel with negative opinions from friends (Study
2) and watching a movie trailer with positive recommenda-
tions from friends (Study 3).
Online survey
To collect the data we conducted the three studies in the
form of surveys on Amazon’s Mechanical Turk during July
and August 2011. Amazon’s Mechanical Turk (MTurk) is
a crowdsourcing online marketplace where requesters use
human intelligence of workers to perform certain tasks, also
known as HITs (Human Intelligence Tasks). Workers browse
among existing tasks and complete them for a monetary pay-
ment set by the requester [18].
Once a worker completes the task, the requester can decide
whether to approve it. In particular, if the requester believes
that the worker completed the task randomly, he can reject
her work. In that case, the worker does not get paid for the
particular task and her approval rate is decreased. For our
studies, we only hired workers that had approval rates of
over 95%, that is, workers who had performed well in the
past.
We asked each worker to put herself in the following hypo-
thetical situation: she is about to book a hotel (resp. watch
a movie trailer) an on e-commerce site (resp. online), and
among the options, she has come down to two between which
she is indifferent. The website has an underlying social net-
work of friends (or it runs on top of an online social net-
work). For each of the two options, we provide the following
information:
(i) the overall rating (in terms of stars on the scale of 1 to
5) based on ratings from a large number of previous cus-
tomers (resp. users) in the case of selecting which hotel to
book (resp. which movie trailer to watch)
(ii) the number of friends who recommend (resp. have neg-
ative opinions about) the option in the case of positive
(resp. negative) recommendations
For each question, the option that has more stars is the one
that is less recommended by friends; that is, we did not use
a pair of options where one clearly dominated the other.
Figure 1. Sample questions for Studies 1, 2, and 3 (top to bottom).
A sample question from each survey is shown in Figure 1.
Each question consists of two parts: 1) “Which one would
you choose?” and 2) “Which one do you think others would
choose?” The answer to the first question provides informa-
tion on how a particular worker trades off information from
friends and the general public when making her choice. We
only use the data from this question for our analysis.
Even though we do not use the answers to the second ques-
tion for our analysis, we included it in the survey for two rea-
sons. First, by asking the second question the subjects felt
that the survey’s goal was to study how people think their
decisions are similar to the others, weakening the reactivity
effect [14]. Second, we offered three bonus payments ($5 or
$10 each, which is 50 or 100 times the amount we paid for
each HIT) to the three workers whose answers to the second
question was closest to the others’ answers to the first ques-
tion in order to deter workers from answering randomly.
Validity check. Apart from using the bonus to incentivize
workers to put some thought when answering the survey, we
incorporated two “validity check” questions in the survey. If
a worker did not answer these two questions correctly, we
did not include any of her responses in our analysis (and re-
jected her work). In the first such question one option clearly
dominated the other in terms of both the number of stars
and friends’ recommendations (one option had only one star
and 10 negative recommendations from friends, whereas the
other had more stars and 10 positive recommendations from
friends). The second test question was a repeated question
with the order of choices reversed and also with no graphics.
Responses with inconsistencies in the answers to these two
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19%
4%
53%
24%
Education
High School Graduate
Associates Degree
Bachelors Degree
Graduate Degree
6%
59%
24%
8%
3% 0%
Age
age <20 20 =< age <30
30 =< age <40 40 =< age <50
50 =< age <60 age > 60
Figure 2. Demographics
questions were discarded and not considered in the analy-
sis. We ran the experiments until we got 350 valid responses
for each study. Overall, we rejected 33% of the responses
across all 3 studies because they were invalid. The aver-
age completion time for each valid HIT was 174.8 seconds
while the average completion time for the invalid HITS was
153.3; this suggests that the workers that were rejected had
not taken the task as seriously as the rest of the workers.
In addition to the “validity check” questions, each study con-
sisted of 8 questions (with the format of Figure 1) which
we use in our analysis and 3 demographics questions asking
about the gender, the age and the education level of the re-
spondent. Overall, 36% of the approved respondents, were
female. Other demographic information for the approved re-
spondents according to the self-reporting of the workers are
plotted in Figure 2.
Model Specification
For each question, there are two options that the worker can
select form, which we refer to as option 1 and option 2. We
denote the number of stars Si and the number of friend rec-
ommendations by Fi, for i = 1, 2. To predict the probability
that option 1 is selected, we conduct a logistic regression
on our dataset of choices with the difference in the number
of stars (i.e., S1 − S2) and friends (i.e., F1 − F2) for each
question as the predictor variables. In particular,
Pr[choose option 1] = logit(αs ·(S1−S2)+αf ·(F1−F2)).
We note that a number of other empirical studies also use the
logit choice function to model social influence [20, 10, 23].
RESULTS
In this section, we report the results from each survey sepa-
rately.
Table 1. Positive
Predictor Estimated Coefficients z-value
αf 0.20471∗∗∗ (0.027) 7.597
αs 0.73549∗∗∗ (0.050) 14.307
Note: Standard errors are shown in parentheses.
Signif. codes: 0 ’***’ 0.001 ’**’ 0.01 ’*’ 0.05 ’.’ 0.1 ’ ’ 1
Pseudo-R2 = 0.95
Study 1: Positive Opinions for Hotels
Model 1
As mentioned in the previous section, we examine the re-
sults by fitting a logistic regression model. We first only
considered the difference in the number of stars and friends
as predictor variables. The estimated coefficients along with
other parameters are depicted in Table 1, and as can be seen
both are statistically significant. Observe that both coeffi-
cients are positive; this is intuitive, since more stars (resp.
more positive recommendations) indicate that the option is
better and thus the worker is more likely to select it. Finally,
the pseudo -R2 for this model1 is 0.95, indicating that the fit
is very good.
Interpretation of the coefficients We interpret the coeffi-
cients for our model in terms of marginal effects on the odds
ratio. The odds ratio measures the probability that the de-
pendent variable is equal to 1 relative to the probability that
it is equal to zero. For the logit model, the log odds of the
outcome is modeled as a linear combination of the predictor
variables; therefore, the odds ratio of a coefficient is equal
to exp(coefficient). Since αs = 0.735, we conclude that a
unit increase in S1 − S2, multiplies the initial odds ratio by
exp(0.735) = 2.07. In other words, the relative probability
of choosing option 1 increases by 107%. For the friends pre-
dictor variable, the odds ratio is equal to exp(0.204) = 1.22,
meaning that, the relative probability of selecting option 1
increase by 22% if F1 − F2 increases by one unit.
To further assess the predictive power of the model, we per-
formed cross validation. We left out one question at a time
and estimated the coefficients using the remaining questions.
Then, we predicted the probabilities for the question that was
left out. The predicted values were very close in all cases
with absolute mean difference of 0.021. The actual values
and their differences can be found in Table 2.
Finally, we used one of the questions of this survey twice
in Amazon’s Mechanical Turk (in two separate HITS) in
order to see whether workers would react to the question
1We computed Efron’s pseudo -R2 which is defined as follows:
R2 = 1−
∑N
i=1(yi − pii)2∑N
i=1(yi − y¯)2
where, N is the number of observations in the model, y is the de-
pendent variable, y¯ is the mean of the y values, and pˆi is the proba-
bilities predicted by the logit model. The numerator of the ratio is
the sum of the squared differences between the actual y values and
the predicted pi probabilities. The denominator of the ratio is the
sum of squared differences between the actual y values and their
mean [13].
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Table 2. Cross validation for study 1
Left out question Actual Predicted |Difference|
Q1 0.54 0.53 0.01
Q2 0.58 0.55 0.03
Q3 0.71 0.62 0.09
Q4 0.74 0.74 0.00
Q5 0.77 0.77 0.00
Q6 0.74 0.72 0.02
Q7 0.82 0.83 0.01
Q8 0.54 0.53 0.01
Table 3. Stduies 1 and 2: demographic information included
Predictor Study 1 Study 2
αf 0.263∗∗∗ (0.19) 0.35∗∗∗ (0.07)
αs 0.793∗∗∗ (0.08) 0.66∗∗∗ (0.12)
genderf -0.006 (0.07) -0.02 (0.06)
genders 0.31. (0.16) -0.13 (0.11)
edu1s 0.11 (0.16) -0.01 (0.11)
edu1f 0.04 (0.08) -0.02 (0.07)
edu2s -0.11 (0.46) 0.16 (0.40)
edu2f -0.16 (0.23) 0.18 (0.63)
edu3s -0.05 (0.16) -0.03 (-3.1)
edu3f -0.02 (0.08) -0.24 (-0.31)
age1s 0.061 (0.39) -0.12 (0.15)
age1f 0.02 (0.21) -0.14 (0.11)
age2s 0.06 (0.16) 0.17 (0.12)
age2f 0.11 (0.08) 0.16 (0.08)
age3s -0.08 (0.34) -0.05 (0.16)
age3f -0.02 (0.18) -0.13 (0.10)
age4s -0.05 (0.16) 0.10 (0.11)
age4f -0.17 (0.08) 0.04 (0.07)
age5s 0.16 (0.40) 0.05 (0.24)
age5f 0.03 (0.22) 0.15 (0.17)
Note: Standard errors are shown in parentheses.
Signif. codes: 0 ’***’ 0.001 ’**’ 0.01 ’*’ 0.05 ’.’ 0.1 ’ ’ 1
in similar ways. We found that the percentage of workers
that chose the first option of the question was similar in both
cases (26% versus 24%), further validating our approach.
Model 1’
In Model 1’, we included all self reported demographic in-
formation as predictor variables in addition to the stars and
friend recommendation variables. This information includes:
gender, age (in five 10-year brackets from 20 to 60 years old:
called age1-5), and education level (high school, associates
degree, bachelors degree, and graduate degree: called edu1-
3). More specifically, we coded the following variables as
dummy variables. The estimated coefficients and other in-
formation is shown in the second column of Table 3. As
can be seen in Table 3, these extra coefficients are not sta-
tistically significant. This suggests that people in different
demographics trade off ratings from the public and friend
recommendations similarly.
Table 4. Negative
Predictor Estimated Coefficients z-value
αf -0.281∗∗∗ (0.030) 9.378
αs 0.503∗∗∗ (0.050) 10.018
Note: Standard errors are shown in parentheses.
Signif. codes: 0 ’***’ 0.001 ’**’ 0.01 ’*’ 0.05 ’.’ 0.1 ’ ’ 1
Pseudo-R2 = 0.95
Table 5. Cross validation for study 2
Left out question Actual Predicted |Difference|
Q1 0.30 0.25 0.05
Q2 0.39 0.41 0.02
Q3 0.43 0.44 0.01
Q4 0.54 0.53 0.01
Q5 0.58 0.60 0.02
Q6 0.38 0.39 0.01
Q7 0.40 0.42 0.02
Q8 0.45 0.50 0.05
Study 2: Negative Opinions for Hotels
Model 2
In the previous subsection, we examined how positive rec-
ommendations from friends and the number of stars influ-
ence users’ choices. In this section we look at negative opin-
ions from friends — instead of positive recommendations.
In particular, each option is characterized by the number of
stars (based on information from the general public) as well
as the number of friends who have negative opinions about
it. We examine the data by fitting a logit model. The esti-
mated coefficients are reported in Table 4. As can be seen
in the table both variables are statistically significant and
the pseudo-R2 measure for this model is 0.95 which implies
that the model is a good fit. Moreover, as we would expect,
the friends coefficient is negative in this case, as more neg-
ative opinions from friends decrease the probability that the
worker selects an option.
Interpretation of the coefficients Similarly to Study 1, we
interpret the coefficients for our model in terms of marginal
effects on the odds ratio. For the present model (negative
recommendations), the fact that αs = 0.503 means that one
unit increase in S1 − S2, multiplies the initial odds ratio by
exp(0.503) = 1.65. In other words, the relative probability of
choosing option 1 increases by 65%. For the friends predic-
tor variable, the odds ratio is equal to exp(−0.281) = 0.75,
which means that the relative probability of selecting option
1 decreasing by 25%. Equivalently, the relative probability
of selecting option 1 when F1 − F2 decreases by one unit
is (exp(0.281) − 1) ≈ 32%. For this study we did cross
validation as well to test the predictive power of our model.
The results are shown in Table 5. The predicted and actual
values are very close (mean absolute difference = 0.231).
Model 2’
Similarly to Model 1’, in this model we include all vari-
ables: stars, friends’ opinions, and demographics informa-
tion in the model. The results are shown in the last column
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Table 6. Less serious decision
Predictor Estimated Coefficients z-value
αf 0.167∗∗∗ (0.049) 7.101
αs 0.349∗∗∗ (0.027) 6.014
Note: Standard errors are shown in parentheses.
Signif. codes: 0 ’***’ 0.001 ’**’ 0.01 ’*’ 0.05 ’.’ 0.1 ’ ’ 1
Pseudo-R2 = 0.61
of Table 3. As for Model 1’, the estimated demographic co-
efficients are not statistically significant, meaning that the
addition of demographic information does not improve the
predictive power (compared to Model 2). In other words,
individuals choose between options in these situations simi-
larly across all demographics.
Study 3: Positive Opinions for Movie Trailers
Model 3
Our third study considers the effect of positive recommen-
dations from friends in a low risk decision: choosing which
movie trailer to watch. We perform a logistic regression and
report the estimated coefficients in Table 6. The estimated
coefficients are statistically significant; however, in this case
pseudo-R2 is 0.61 which is lower than the pseudo-R2’s for
previous models Models 1 and 2 (0.95). The coefficients
for stars and friends are αs = 0.349 and αf = 0.167. As
for Model 1, both coefficients are positive, since people are
more likely to select an option if it has more stars and/or
more positive recommendations from friends. By computing
the odds ratios, we conclude that an additional star increases
the probability of selecting that option by 41%, whereas an
additional friend recommendation increases the probability
by 18%.
DISCUSSION
This paper studies how positive and negative opinions from
friends affect our decisions compared to ratings from the
crowd for different types of decisions. Our three user stud-
ies result in some interesting conceptual findings about the
tradeoff between these two types of social influence.
First, we see that an additional star has a much larger effect
than an additional friend recommendation on the probability
of selecting an item. In particular, in all three studies one
more star increases the probability of selecting that option
more than one more (resp. less) friend in the case of positive
(resp. negative) recommendations. Equivalently, the odds
ratio of the stars’ coefficient is larger than the odds ratio of
the friends’ coefficient (2.07 versus 1.22, 1.65 versus 1.32
and 1.41 versus 1.18 for studies 1, 2 and 3 respectively).
This does not mean that the number of friends’ positive or
negative recommendations does not influence decisions; on
the contrary, an additional recommendation (resp. one less
negative opinion) from friends changes the probability by at
least 18% across all three studies. The fact that an additional
star has a larger effect that an additional friend opinion is rea-
sonable if we consider that the number of stars is bounded
between 1 and 5, whereas the number of friends’ recommen-
dations may take values from a larger range.
Second, negative opinions from friends are more influential
on one’s decision than positive opinions. We can see this by
comparing the odds ratios of Study 1 and Study 2, in which
the number of positive and negative friends’ opinions are
shown respectively: the odds ratio for the friends variable is
higher in Study 2 (1.32 versus 1.22), whereas the odds ratio
for the stars variable is higher in Study 1 (2.07 versus 1.65).
In other words, one less negative opinion from a friend has
a larger effect than one more positive opinion, whereas one
more star increases the odds of an option being chosen less
in the case that negative opinions from friends are present.
Such an asymmetry between the effect of negative and posi-
tive actions and opinions have been studied in the social psy-
chology literature [6, 21, 24]. The positive-negative asym-
metry effect has been observed in many domains such as im-
pression formation [2], information-integration paradigm [3]
and prospect theory for decision making under risk [17].
The finding in all the above cited work is that negativity has
stronger effects than equally intense positivity. Our results
confirm this finding in online settings.
Third, people exhibit more random behavior when the de-
cision involves less cost and less risk. We can see this by
comparing the results from Study 1 and Study 3, where the
decisions are “which hotel to book” and “which movie trailer
to watch” respectively. Booking a hotel clearly involves a
monetary cost and some risk, whereas the worse thing that
can happen with a movie trailer is to waste a couple of min-
utes of one’s time. The odds ratios are lower in Study 3
than Study 1 (1.18 versus 1.22 for friends, and 1.41 versus
2.07 for stars). This implies that one added star or friend has
a smaller influence on one’s decision in the case of movie
trailers. Moreover, the fraction of respondents choosing ei-
ther option is closer to half compared to the hotel booking
surveys. This implies that the choices were more random
in this case, which may be explained by the fact that choos-
ing which movie trailer to watch is a less important/serious
decision than booking a hotel.
Forth, for all of our user studies, we find out that the demo-
graphic variables (gender, age, and education level) do not
significantly impact the choice that is made, implying that
people across different demographics trade off recommen-
dations from friends and ratings from the crowd in a similar
way.
In addition to the aforementioned conceptual findings, we
have estimated a mathematical model that describes how
users trade off friends’ opinions and recommendation from
the crowd in a variety of settings.
Practical Implications
Our studies offer insights that can be useful in various online
domains such as recommender systems, social search results
ranking, online advertisement placement, online social net-
work newsfeed rankings, and social shopping websites. In
these applications when both friends’ recommendations and
ratings from the general public are available, our estimated
model can help the platform determine which option to dis-
play or what ranking to display the options for a given user.
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As an example, consider a specific user that is searching for a
hotel on a booking website. There are two hotels that match
the user’s search criteria, hotel A and hotel B. Assume that
hotel A has 3 stars from customer ratings and 4 (positive)
recommendations from the user’s friends, and hotel B has
4 stars but only 2 (positive) recommendations from friends.
According to the results of Study 1, the user is more likely
to prefer hotel B (if everything else is equal). Thus, if the
booking website does not have any additional information
about the user’s preferences, it should recommend hotel B
to the user, or equivalently rank hotel B higher than hotel A
if it provides personalized ranking of hotels to the user. Such
personalization benefits both the user and the booking web-
site by improving user experience and increase the chances
that the user books a hotel through the website..
The same ideas can be applied to recommender systems based
on collaborative filtering and in particular social recommender
systems. Social recommender systems, leverage users’ friends’
actions to determine which items to recommend. The choice
and ranking of the items can be obtained using our model.
The same is true for social search. Finally, a marketer that
wishes to maximize the probability that a user selects a given
item may be able to strategically select what information to
show to the user.
Limitations. In our studies, users could only see the num-
ber of friends that had positive or negative opinions about an
item — and not the names of the corresponding friends. We
focused on the number of friends, because in this way we can
get more general qualitative results. Moreover, given that
people tend to have a large number of friends in online social
networks, showing the number of friends (instead of specific
names) may be a good way to avoid privacy concerns. Nev-
ertheless, we note that opinions from specific friends could
have a different effect than the number of friends and that
this can be an interesting future direction.
DYNAMICS OF MARKET SHARE
Thus far we have studied how an individual chooses between
two items when the information she has consists of the opin-
ions of her friends and ratings from the general public. This
means that the information that is available to the individ-
ual when she makes her decision depends on the decisions
that her friends and other consumers/users have made in the
past. In this section we consider a setting with a population
of individuals that make decisions one at a time and the in-
formation available to someone at time t depends on what
others chose (and what they thought about what they chose)
before time t. Given this process, we study the dynamics of
market share.
Previous literature has studied the effects of social influence
in dynamic settings [5, 8, 26, 11, 7, 9]. Part of this liter-
ature focuses on whether market share converges and the
properties of its limit points. The decision of an individual
at time t is usually assumed to depend on the market share
at that time. In contrast to previous literature, we consider
two types of social influence: friends and the general public.
Moreover, we consider a setting with ratings and incorporate
the individuals’ rating decisions in the process.
In order to focus on the effect of friends and the general pub-
lic on one’s decision (which is the central theme of this pa-
per), we assume that an individual is otherwise indifferent
between option 1 and 2 before making her decision. In par-
ticular, we assume that she has no additional private infor-
mation that affects her decision. However, we note that it is
straightforward to incorporate the effect of private informa-
tion in our simulations.
Given a social network and two options (say 1 and 2), we
consider the following process.
• Initialization: At t = 0 two individuals are randomly cho-
sen. One of them is assigned option 1 and the other option
2.
• At time t, an individual that has not made a choice is ran-
domly selected.
– Selection: The chosen individual selects option 1 with
probability
logit(αs · (S1(t)− S2(t)) + αf · (F1(t)− F2(t)),
where Si(t) is the average number of stars for option
i up to time t, and Fi(t) is the number of friends of
the individual that have previously chosen option i
and recommend it.
– Rating: The individual provides a rating for the op-
tion she chose. If she chose option i, her rating is
drawn from a Gaussian distribution with mean Si(t)
and standard deviation σ.
– Recommendation: The individual recommends the
item she chose to her friends if her rating exceeds
some threshold θ.
For our simulations, we set αs = 0.73, αf = 0.22 (which
are the estimated coefficients from Study 1), but note that
other choices for these parameters give qualitatively similar
results. We study how the market share of product 1 evolves
over time for various values of the standard deviation σ and
the threshold θ.
We note that when the threshold θ is equal to zero, an in-
dividual always recommends the option she selects to her
friends. This is similar to models in prior literature (e.g., [7,
9]), where an individual’s decision is affected by how many
others already bought a product (e.g., its market share) and
not by the opinions of those people about the product.
The social network used in this paper for simulations is a co-
authorship network of scientists working on network theory
and experiment [19]. The network consists of 1589 nodes
and 2743 edges and has the properties common for social
networks such as power law degree distribution. Our simu-
lations show that the market share of each option converges
to some value, but there is not a unique limit point: different
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Figure 3. 3 sample paths of market shares for the product with higher
initial rating (S01 = 4 and S
0
2 = 2).
runs usually converge to different limits. For instance, Fig-
ure 3 shows three sample paths for the market share of option
1 when σ = 1 and θ = 0 and initial star ratings of S01 = 4
and S02 = 2 stars respectively. We ran same simulations for
other numbers of initial stars which were qualitatively the
same.
The multiplicity of limit points has been previously observed
in settings with one type of social influence. In particular, [7]
shows that when objective evidence is weak (and thus de-
cisions are only affected by social influence), then the limit
point is not predetermined, or in other words, there are many
potential limit points [7]. We observe that this also holds in
a setting with two types of social influence (friends and the
general public). However, in contrast to the setting of Ben-
dor et al., in our setting certain limit points are more likely
than others.
In general, there is a range of likely limit points, which de-
pends on the standard deviation σ (of the normal distribution
from which the ratings come from) and the threshold θ. We
study the effect of σ and θ on the distribution of limit points.
Figure 4 shows the histograms for the frequency of different
limit points when θ = 0 for σ = 0.5 and σ = 1, S01 = 4
and S02 = 2 (based on 500 runs). These histograms approx-
imate the corresponding distributions of limit points. We
observe that the range of likely outcomes becomes narrower
when the standard deviation is smaller. In other words, the
variability of limit points increases when the variability of
ratings increases.
We next consider the effect of the threshold θ for a fixed σ.
The histograms in Figure 5 show the market share for op-
tion 1 for θ = 0, 2, 4 when σ = 1 (based on 500 runs) with
initial star ratings of S01 = 3 and S
0
2 = 2. We observe that
as θ increases, the distribution of limit points increases (in
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the sense of first order stochastic dominance). In particular,
if θ1 < θ2, then the limit point distribution for θ2 stochasti-
cally dominates the distribution for θ1. This implies that the
product with the higher initial rating is more likely to have a
larger market share for larger values of θ.
Observe that as θ increases, individuals become more selec-
tive in terms of when to recommend an item to their friends.
When θ = 0, an individual recommends any item she buys to
her friends. On the other extreme, when θ = 5, an individual
only recommends items that she is extremely satisfied with.
Figure 5 suggests that when individuals become more selec-
tive in their recommendations, then it becomes even more
likely to have a large market share for the option that ini-
tially dominates (in terms of having more stars at time 0), or
in other words, inequality increases.
CONCLUSION
Our study of how online users make choices based on infor-
mation from friend recommendations and ratings from the
general public is important for a range of online applications
in particular social search results ranking, recommender sys-
tems, online advertisement placement, online social network
newsfeed rankings, and social shopping websites. When
both friends’ recommendations and ratings from the general
public are available, our estimated model can help the plat-
form determine which option to display or in what ranking
to display the options for a given user.
Our results offer insights that can be useful in various on-
line domains. Specifically we found that (1) one additional
star has a larger effect than one more friend recommenda-
tion, (2) negative opinions from friends are more influential
than positive opinions, and (3) people show more random
behavior in their choices when lower cost or risk is incurred.
Our study of the dynamics of market share in the presence
of these two forms of social influence reveals that the vari-
ability of outcomes increases when the variability of ratings
increases, and inequality increases when individuals become
more selective in their recommendations.
While this paper focuses on two sources of information, namely
friends’ opinions and ratings from the general public, our
approach can also be applied to the study of how individu-
als trade off information from other sources, such as experts,
celebrities, and the media.
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